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Introduction

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, a Joint Task Force conducted a forcible entry operation in Panama. The operation was called Operation Just Cause. Pre-assault fires commenced with the employment of precision-guided munitions by two F-117 stealth aircraft at the Rio Hato airfield. AC-130 gunships provided additional tactical airpower targeting President Noriega's Comandancia, Paitilla airfield, Torrijos/Tocumen International airport, Rio Hato airfield, and the Pacora River Bridge. The complexity and precision of the operation were evident in the mix of forward deployed and CONUS based conventional and special operations air, ground, and naval forces, simultaneously striking 27 targets throughout Panama within 53 hours of the President's decision to conduct operations. The result of this coup de main was the restoration of a legitimate government in a matter of days and with few casualties.
-Chapter 3, FM 100-15
There are unique challenges that may lead to disjointed efforts in planning, coordinating, and the command and control of tactical airpower during joint forcible entry contingency operations. U.S. Army, Air Force and Joint Doctrine have been developed in recent years to reduce the disorganized efforts between services, yet the highly complex nature of forcible entry contingency operations involves many contributory factors: limited planning time, ad hoc staffs, and mixed conventional and special operations airpower are just a few of the factors. Since doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures have been developed to effectively employ airpower in contingency operations, why does our military have such difficulty in fully employing airpower during this type of operation?
The United States military has become increasing involved in regional conflicts that are short of war. These small-scale contingency operations are difficult to predict and even more difficult to mitigate. As a joint force, the services are required to plan and execute small-scale contingency operations in accordance with Joint Publication 3-18.
Given the complexity of forcible entry joint contingency operations, does our joint doctrine fully address the effective employment of tactical airpower in support of forcible entry contingency operations?
This study will examine three recent United States military operations, which were conducted as forcible entry contingency operations. The US military has jointly defined forcible entry operations as "an offensive operation for seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition".
1 Forcible entry operations are complex and by necessity, joint. Typically, only hours to days separate the alert notification and deployment. This type of operation secures an initial lodgment that includes an airfield or beachhead. The airfield or beachhead becomes a focal point for rapid force projection.
When required, initial entry forces expand the lodgment to include a suitable seaport of debarkation for follow-on forces. Once the lodgment is secure, follow-on forces deploy into the lodgment. 2 The forcible entry of an airhead or beachhead is complicated by the restrictions on the use of tactical airpower. A forcible entry mission requires the limitation of fires to prevent the destruction of the air/beachhead and it's associated facilities. 3 Primarily, tactical airpower employed as a part of the counterland airspace function. As an impromptu operation, Operation Urgent Fury highlighted our inability to plan and command/control tactical airpower in support of joint operations, and our ability to employ airpower in small-scale contingency operations. This combat action would provide significant lessons in the employment of airpower, which would be applied in the next contingency operation. 4 The second case study, Operation Just Cause, is the operation to capture the indicted Panamanian dictator, Manuel Noriega, and restore a state of democracy to the country of Panama. This case study demonstrates the knowledge learned from Operation Urgent Fury and our ability to apply the lessons six years later. The operation was similar to Operation Urgent Fury with the added benefit of over 14 months of detailed planning and rehearsals. 5 The third case study, Operation Restore Hope, represents the tactical employment of airpower in differing roles: deterrence, compellence, and tactical force. The operation was conducted in order to provide security to United Nations relief efforts in Somalia.
The operation transitioned from nation building to one of capturing the warring clan leaders, which culminated on October 3-4 1993. 6 The case studies demonstrate that the misuse or failure to effectively employ tactical airpower can result in higher casualties, collateral damage and mission failure. Current doctrine, training, and war gaming must be improved to employ tactical airpower to its fullest capabilities. 3 Bonham, Gordon C., "Airfield Seizure, the Modern Key to the Country", Fort Leavenworth, KS., 1991. page 2. 4 Eliason, William T. USAF Support to Low Intensity Conflict: Three Case Studies from the 1980's., Maxwell AFB, AL June 1994., page 2. 5 Ibid, page 3. 6 Hicks, J. Marcus., "Fire in the City: Airpower in Urban Smaller Scale Contingencies", Maxwell AFB, AL., June 1999., page 74 7 Ibid., page X. Panama. 14 The planners developed three basic courses of action. "They were (1) the use of overwhelming force to subdue the PDF, (2) surgical raids to seize Noriega, and (3) limited attacks against the PDF headquarters to destroy its ability to C2." 15 Each plan had it's own strengths and weaknesses, and differed in time on the ground. Overall, the plans were sound and efficient. 16 The JTF was able to pre-position forces and conduct multiple joint rehearsals during the months prior to the operation. As a result, the joint military planning and coordination were exemplary. Operation Urgent Fury was not going to be executed again at the operational and strategic levels of war.
Case Study Summary
The seizure of two airfields was critical to the success of the operation. One key airfield, Torrijos/Tocumen (T/T) International Airport, would serve as a secure staging base for follow-on forces. The 1 st Ranger Battalion (+) was assigned responsibility for the mission. T/T was not only a tactical objective, but it held strategic and operational value as well. T/T was Panama's only international airport, which was critical to the country's economy, thus minimal collateral damage was required. Also, the airport was City. 17 The seizure of T/T was essential to the operation. In order to meet the objectives of the "Coup de Main", additional ports of entry were required, thus the necessity for a large airport.
The role of airpower in the operation was a strategic enabler, and essential during every combat operation. The nine AC-130 Spectre gunships, allocated throughout the JTF, provided pre-assault fires, suppressing fires, and close air support during the operation. The AC-130 was chosen due to its accuracy and lethality. 18 Collateral damage was minimized with the maximum amount of firepower delivered to targets.
Synchronizing fires with maneuver forces was very difficult, yet the AC-130's provided responsive and accurate fires in support of ground operations. The AC-130's unique capabilities (sensors, fire control, and munitions) in urban environments allow the platform to identify and attack threats within minutes and seconds of friendly force insertion. 19 There were limitations, though. There was a friendly fire incident in which a gunship misidentified a friendly vehicle due to high ambient light levels, even though it was marked accordingly. 20 The low yield munitions helped reduce collateral damage, but did not achieve the desired effects on armor vehicles and concrete re-enforced targets.
"The F-117 missions demonstrated the limitations of precision guided munitions and the deliverable weapon systems" 21 The threat of collateral damage reduces the PGM employment capabilities and reduced their use in the restrictive urban operations environment.
The U.S. has identified these and other shortfalls. New marking devices have been developed and incorporated into training. More accurate and lethal precision-guided munitions have been developed and implemented in the Gulf, the Balkans, and
Afghanistan. Training and communicating with air assets is very difficult. We must continue to train in this joint environment, in order to perfect our skills in joint operations.
Case Study Three: Operation Restore Hope:
In December 1992, the United Nations adopted Security Council Resolution 794, which included a mandate for military intervention in Somalia as part of a humanitarian relief effort. 22 USCENTCOM designated I MEF as the JTF-Somalia. The JTF mission statement identified four objectives in Somalia: (1) Secure major air and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points, (2) Provide open and free passage of relief supplies, (3) Provide security for convoys and relief organization preparation, and (4) Assist the UN/NGO's in providing humanitarian relief operations under UN auspices.
23
The JTF began contingency planning in order to execute the assigned mission.
From the receipt of initial orders, until the deployment of forces, the JTF had just over seven days to plan, rehearse, and coordinate joint and combined staff and command components. The JTF planners possessed relatively little knowledge of the theater of operations, the competing belligerents, or the type of operation that the NCA anticipated to be executed. 24 Upon notification of the time sensitive, contingency operation, the JTF planners followed a logical progression of prioritizing the competing requirements in a critical task list. This critical task list was executed in a sequential manner. 25 Phase I of the OPLAN outlined four objectives of which three were the security of airfields and seaports. The fourth was the security of the U.S. Embassy. Marine forces were to secure the Mogadishu air and seaport, the Baledogle Airfield for follow-on Army forces, and the Baidoa airfield. 26 Once this phase is completed the JTF will expand operations to include security of additional relief distribution centers, expansion into the interior of the country, and finally transfer of control from the U.S. to UN forces. From 9
December to 15 December 1992 Phase I objectives were accomplished. Phase I ended 15 days ahead of schedule. 27 The air component command established in Somalia was the Airspace Control Agency (ACA), which consisted primarily of Marine personnel from the 3 rd Marine Air
Wing. 28 The ACA was responsible for airspace management, coordinating flight schedules, and operation of the Joint Rescue Coordination Center. 29 The ACA coordinated air assets from each of the four services and multi-national air forces in support of the Operation Restore Hope. The air coordination in support of these forcible entry operations was limited. The JTF established the ACA to ensure each operation was coordinated and synchronized from an air perspective, however, the ACA lacked the authority to task or control most of the air assets in theater. The ACA had to work through the J3 Air and the COMNAVFOR to coordinate carrier based aircraft. Also, in the early stages of the operation, the ACA's coordination requirements were limited due to the preponderance of forces being Marines from the MEU. Given the inter-service relationship of the Marines and supporting Navy assets, this wasn't truly a joint operation, thus the ACA was not included.
During this contingency operation, carrier based attack aircraft were used in the tactical airpower role. They flew numerous missions over Somalia, but did not attack any targets. As a result of not conducting any attacks, due to the lack of credible targets, the Somali's were not threatened by the aircraft. Yet once AC130's arrived in the theater of operations, they immediately demonstrated their capabilities. The Somali's were frightened by the lethality of the weapon system, which served as a deterrent to the fighting clans. 31 Thus the employment of tactical airpower was more of a show of force than actual support missions.
Operationally, Operation Restore Hope was difficult to anticipate, plan, and prepare for. The complexity of the uncertain operational environment presented the military forces with an undefined enemy. Even though the U.S. had limited operational objectives, this operation included the overwhelming use of combat power, to include airpower, to establish conditions that would lead to regional stability. 2 Ibid, page 10. 3 Ibid, page 11. 4 Ibid, page 12. 5 Ibid., page 12. 6 Ibid., page 16. 7 Ibid., page17. 8 Ibid., page 18.
Doctrine: Joint and Service Agreement "Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort."
General George H. Decker, USA
The national military strategy relies on a CONUS based force projection and employment of an immediately available overseas presence. In order to remain credible as a deterrent and as a viable military option for policy enforcement, US military forces must be capable of deploying and fighting to gain access to geographical areas controlled by hostile forces.
1 Thus, the capability to execute forcible entry operations is paramount. The command and control of the airpower is established by the JFACC's designation of an airspace control area, which is normally defined by the "boundaries that delineate the operational area." 6 During airborne/air assault operations, the responsibilities of the JFACC, area air defense commander, and the airspace control authority are interrelated and are normally assigned to one individual. The close coordination between these three responsibilities is critical. The JFACC may elect to employ airborne C2 assets to enhance the coordination and control of joint air operations and airspace management. 7 In order to conduct successful forcible entry operations, the JFC must set the operational conditions. The JFC strives to achieve the following: "surprise, control of the air, control of the space environment, control of the sea, isolate the lodgment, neutralization of enemy forces within the lodgment, management of environmental factors, and the integration of psychological operations and civil military operations." 8 The conditions are set during the first phase (planning and deployment) of the contingency operation. Air interdiction is one method used to prepare assault objectives for the commitment of assault forces. During phase 2 (assault) of the operation, the joint force uses surprise to overwhelm the enemy and protect assault forces. Pre-assault fires by tactical airpower assets are employed to destroy enemy forces, enemy reserves, aircraft, theater missiles, and naval forces that could disrupt the operation. 9 Additionally, once assault forces have landed, they must be able to immediately employ joint airpower to destroy, interdict, or suppress enemy forces. This allows the JFC to maintain the initiative in seizing the initial assault objectives and prepare forces for follow-on operations.
The considerations the JFC must account for are as follows: mission, threat, geography, forces available, time available, forcible entry options, connectivity, command relationships, etc. Once the JFC accounts for these considerations, he must synchronize the operation. Synchronization is the orchestration of all available forces in a way to capitalize on the joint forces synergistic effect. This will seize the initiative from the enemy and defeat them. 10 Synchronization is particularly critical during airborne and air assault operations. Speed and surprise is paramount to the success of these operations. In order to achieve speed and surprise the synchronization of pre-assault fires and the introduction of ground forces is critical. The enemy must not be allowed to react decisively or operationally reposition forces. The employment of tactical airpower at critical times will prevent the enemy from executing cohesive and decisive maneuvers. We will have maintained the initiative.
United States Army Doctrine
The Army lists Forcible Entry Operations as one of its core competencies, which are the essential and enduring capabilities of our service. FM 1 describes forcible entry operations as the following: "Multidimensional Army forces provide a forcible entry capability to access contested areas worldwide. They can be ready to fight immediately and prepare for the arrival of follow-on forces. This capability is essential to reduce predictability, dominate a situation, deny an adversary his objectives, contain a conflict, conduct decisive operations, deter protracted conflict, and terminate conflict on our Strategic attack is the application of airpower against an enemy's centers of gravity and other vital targets, such as C2 elements, war production assets, and key supporting
infrastructure. An example of strategic attack occurred during Operation Just Cause, when a flight of two F-117 stealth aircraft dropped precision-guided munitions on the barracks complex at Rio Hato airfield prior to the airdrop of Rangers. The type of airpower asset used or the specific target attacked does not determine strategic attack, but the expected effects on the enemy's capacity or will to wage war. 16 In the planning and conduct of forcible entry operations, the JFC must determine how and when to apply his allocated airpower assets. Given the typical compressed planning time prior to execution, the targeted aspects of the enemy must support the introduction of ground forces. Enemy command and control must be disrupted, enemy air defenses suppressed or destroyed, and enemy troop concentrations neutralized. The combination of counterair, counterland, and strategic attack contributes to the successful force introduction into a hostile area of operations.
Chapter 4 Analysis
An analysis of the case studies determines that airpower was critically important to mission success when rapid precise power projection is required. Additionally, airpower is valuable to the JFC's ability to reduce friendly casualties, limit collateral damage, and support ground maneuver operations with precision guided munitions and technically superior weaponry. The reduction of friendly and civilian casualties, as well as collateral damage in politically sensitive environments is mission critical. 17 This also suggests that due to the influence of airpower on the success of the operations, joint airpower is an integral part of the combined arms team. To be effective at conducting these operations, the Army and Air Force must sufficiently plan, train, and develop the force structure capable of executing these operations as established by joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
The development of joint doctrine provides the basis for how the services should conduct forcible entry operations. Unfortunately, the services are not exposed to joint doctrine until the staff colleges. The services must find a way to integrate joint doctrine into plans and training. Otherwise, the services are unprepared to plan and execute this type of operation.
The requirement for detailed and coordinated planning is critical for the use of airpower. Without it, the air plan could not be developed. Today's joint doctrine Chapter 5
Conclusions
The future holds more opportunities for forcible entry contingency operations. Our capabilities will increase, as well as our enemies. Future operations are not likely to be as survivable as the case studies examined. The proliferation of infrared-guided surface-toair missiles will make future battle space significantly more dangerous. Therefore, future contingency operations must exploit weapon systems and tactics that provide greater survivability. As a result the increased use of armed remotely piloted vehicles and highperformance fixed wing aircraft may be required. 18 Our current and future advances in precision-guided munitions offer tremendous benefits to the JTF commander. The JFACC can tailor munitions and delivery systems to achieve the desired effects. Thus, friendly, civilian, and enemy casualties and collateral damage may be reduced.
Tactical airpower is a critical element across the spectrum of military art. Airpower can be used to achieve political as well as military goals. The proper application of airpower has wide ranging effects (reduction of casualties and collateral damage). But also the misuse of airpower or the failure to fully exploit its capabilities can lead to degraded tactical mission effectiveness. The growing emphasis on joint operations, combined with the use of military force to resolve political situations, requires the continued refinement of joint planning and execution to support forcible entry contingency operations.
